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Abstract 
This chapter discusses the influence of the Soviet Union on Kazakh emigra-
tion from the Xinjiang province of China during the 1940s–1950s, with a focus on 
those who immigrated  to Turkey. The research presented here, based on archival re-
search that centers the narratives of those in the Kazakh diaspora, considers the im-
pact of the relationship between Ospan Batur, a renown Kazakh chieftain, and the 
Soviets, demonstrating the impact of Ospan-Soviet relations on driving Kazakh emi-
gration from Xinjiang. In addition, this chapter examines Kazakh migrant networks 
and their self-identification as Kazakhs, Turks, Muslims, and Chinese.  This chapter 
contributes to existing understandings of Kazakh migration during the mid-20th cen-
tury by establishing the regional and international conditions driving Kazakh emi-
gration during this time. 
1. Introduction
Turkey currently has several populations of Turkic migrants from Xinjiang, a 
northwest province in China, with such migrants primarily of Uyghur and Kazakh 
decent. Chapters 2 of this volume details the current state and activities of Uyghur 
migrants in Turkey. Building on such research, this chapter pays particular attention 
to the historical background of Kazakh emigration from Xinjiang, providing a histori-
ographical survey of the factors that drove and shaped their migration during the 
1940s and 1950s. These decades were characterized by a period of upheaval in Xin-
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jiang, with the emergence of the “second” Eastern Turkestan Republic (ETR) in the 
province bringing a degree of instability and foreign involvement to the region. 
The considerable degree of multi-state involvement in the region – by the So-
viet Union, the United States of America, Outer Mongolia, and China – suggests that 
any analysis of Kazakh migration during this period must consider the foreign poli-
cies of and relationships between actors both inside and outside of Xinjiang. Explor-
ing the ever-evolving relationships between external actors and Kazakh migrants in 
Xinjiang also allows the changing political positions of Kazakh migrants much clearer.  
This chapter focuses on the migration of Kazakh nomads, in part, because 
their nomadic lifestyle enabled cross-border migration of great distances. As this 
study is highly connected with modern Kazakhstan, the analysis presented here ex-
cludes the migration of other groups from consideration, such as the Uyghurs. This 
chapter considers the international context driving the migration of Kazakhs from 
the Altay region, in the north of Xinjiang, to Turkey.  The research presented here fo-
cuses significantly on Ospan Islamŭlï (Osman Batur), a famous leader of the Altay 
Kazakhs who was executed by China’s People’s Liberation Army. As there is already 
significant research on his military activities,1 this chapter makes clear the interna-
tional context in which his activities took place, considering the impact of Soviet and 
the Republic of China’s governmental policies on Kazakh migration. This chapter ar-
gues that the Ospan-led Kazakh revolt against the Xinjiang local government  in 1944
–45 eventually prompted a second wave Kazakh emigration from Xinjiang that begin
in the early 1950s.2 
Existing research on Kazakh migration during the mid-20th century is lack-
ing, in part, because of a large gap between Chinese and Russian accounts on the is-
sue, divergent perspectives rooted in a narrow approach to archival analysis.  This 
gap suggests the need for further integrative research on Kazakh migration during 
this period. To fill this gap in the literature, this study pays particular attention to 
viewpoints from the Kazakh diaspora, such as those found in the works of such 
1     For example, Linda Benson, “Osman Batur: The Kazak’s Golden Legend,” in The Kazaks 
of China: Essays on an Ethnic Minority, eds. L. Benson and I. Svanberg (Uppsala: Uppsala 
University), 141–87. Details will be shown later. 
2    This group includes the Kazakhs led by Qŭsayïn (Hüseyin) Taiji, who began to move 
earlier in 1930s. Also see Chapter 1. Roughly saying, the first migratory group includes 
those who began to migrate in the 1930s through Qinghai and Tibet into Kashmir in 1941, 
and they finally left for Turkey in 1953, while the second group fled into Kashmir in 1951, 
and moved to Turkey in 1952.  
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scholars like G. Mendikulova and N. Ablazhei.3 The narratives of Kazakh migrants 
are worth analyzing because they touch on Kazakh migration to places outside of the 
Middle East, such as migration to the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR). Above 
all, H. Altay and H. Gayretullah are the most famous figures who published their 
memoirs.4 
  After reviewing the perspectives found in existing archival research on the 
history of Kazakh migration, this chapter examines 1) the development of Kazakh 
troops as an initiative military power; 2) the Kazakhs’ relations with various authori-
ties including the Eastern Turkestan Republic, the Soviet Union, and the Guomin-
dang Government of China (GMD) led by the Nationalist Party; and 3) the reason 
why Kazakhs emigrated from Xinjiang to places outside of Central Asia such as Tai-
wan, India, and Turkey. 
 
2. Existing Archival Research on Kazakh Migration 
Earlier archival studies on Kazakh migration have been conducted from the 
perspectives of the Republic of China (ROC) and Xinjiang provincial governments. 
Such research includes the work of L. Benson and D. Wang, both of whom relied on 
Chinese archival sources in their analyses.5 The latest study by J. Jacobs similarly re-
lies on Chinese archival material.6 Other research from the Chinese perspective in-
3   G.M. Mendikulova, Istoricheskie sud'by kazakhskoi diaspory: Proiskhozhdenie i razvitie 
(Almaty: Ghïlïm, 1997); N.N. Ablazhei, Kazakhskii migratsionnyi maiatnik “Kazakhstan-
Sin’tszian”: emigratsiia, repatriatsiia, integratsiia (Novosibirsk: Izd-vo SO RAN, 2015), 16–17. 
For a different discourse, we can refer to the following: Xinjiang hasake zu qianxi shi 
bianxuezu ed. Xinjiang hasake zu qianxi shi (Urumqi: Xinjiang daxue chubanshe, 1993). 
4    Halife Altay, Anayurttan Anadolu'ya (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1981); Hızırbek Gay-
retullah, Altaylarda Kanlı Günler (İstanbul: Ahmet Sait Matbaası, 1977). Matsubara well used 
the former, conducting the interviews with other migrants, see Masatake Matsubara, Kazafu 
yūbokumin no idō: arutai sanmyaku kara toruko e 1934–1953 (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 2011). The 
work of Zhanaltay (Canaltay) can be included here, Dälelkhan Zhanaltay, Qilï zaman – Qiïn 
künder (Almaty: Düniezhüzĭ Qazaqtarïnïng qauïmdastïghï, 2000). For the overview of Ka-
zakh migration, see Äbdĭuaqap Qara, Qazaqtardïng Türkiyagha köshĭ (Almaty: Orkhon, 2016) 
and his Chapter 1 of this volume. Also see the Svanberg’s discussion on the adaptation of 
Kazakhs in Turkey, Ingvar Svanberg, Kazak Refugees in Turkey: A Study of Cultural Persistence 
and Social Change (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1989). 
5   Linda Benson, The Ili Rebellion: the Moslem Challenge to Chinese Authority in Xinjiang, 1944–
1949 (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1990); David Wang, Under the Soviet Shadow: The Yining 
Incident Ethnic Conflicts and International Rivalry in Xinjiang 1944–1949 (Hong Kong: the Chi-
nese University Press, 1999). 
6    Justin Jacobs, Xinjiang and the Modern Chinese State (Seattle: University of Washington 
Press, 2016). Also see his Chapter 5 of this volume. 
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cludes the study “A History of Migration of Xinjiang Kazakh People” published 
within China.7 Interestingly, in such studies, the Eastern Turkestan Republic during 
1940s was less evaluated. Importantly, the archival documents kept in the Academia 
Historica of Taiwan (Guoshiguan) still offer possibilities for further research.8 The re-
search presented in this chapter uses parts of political and administrative documents 
housed in this archive, including the writings of Kazakhs themselves regarding their 
migration. It is necessary to note, however, that such archival documents lack the 
correspondences of local Muslim populations. 
In contrast, research from the Soviet perspective offers a viewpoint of the So-
viet policy. Examples of such studies include those by Russian researcher A. Barmin 
and the recent scholarship of Azerbaijani scholar Dzh. Gasanli. Both scholars based 
their investigations on Soviet archival documents. Japanese scholar K. Terayama has 
also analyzed Soviet-Xinjiang relations in detail, utilizing Soviet archives, particular-
ly those related to Stalin. He has also closely focused on the economic ties between 
USSR and Xinjiang.9 Recent studies clearly indicate that Stalin had great interest in 
Xinjiang and that he changed USSR policies to withdraw government support to the 
Eastern Turkestan government and other Muslim polities. Research based on Mongo-
lian archives, such as that of S. Rakhmetŭlï similarly reflects the Soviet perspective.10 
Finally, Japanese scholars demonstrate several interesting tendencies in their 
research on Kazakh migration that are worth noting. Although the number of studies 
is sparse, their scholarly contributions are significant. For instance, A. Matsunaga’s 
earliest survey on the Kazakhs in Istanbul.11 K. Higa’s interview with an Ospan Ba-
tur’s colleague explores the life history of the famous Kazakh leader. H. Abe’s field-
work research offers another point of view on the eastward migration of Kazakhs 
from Xinjiang into the Qinghai province.12 The important and comprehensive work 
by M. Matsubara follows the migratory route from Altay to Turkey beginning in 
1934, featuring interviews from migrants themselves, including that of Kulanbay 
7     Xinjiang hasake zu qianxi shi bianxuezu ed. Xinjiang hasake zu qianxi shi. 
8      It contains a lot of documents related with the policies of the Republicans of ROC. 
9    Dzhamil’ Gasanly, Sin’tszian v orbite sovetskoi politiki: Stalin i musul’manskoe dvizhenie v Vos-
tochnom Turkestane 1931–1949 (Moscow: FLINTA, 2015); Kyōsuke Terayama, Sutārin to 
Shinkyō: 1931–1949-nen (Tokyo: Shakai hyōronsha, 2015). 
10    Sŭraghan Rakhmetŭlï, XX ghasïr. Ospan – Choybalsan: 1912–1949 zhzh. (Astana: REGIS-ST 
poligraf, 2017). 
11    He conducted the interviews with the famous Kazakh migrant, Khalifa Altay and others, 
see Akira Matsunaga, “Isutanbulu no kazafu jin,” Isuramu sekai 46 (1996), 17–33. 
12  Kiyota Higa, “Intabyū Osupan isuramu shōshi: bukadatta kazafujin eno intabyū,” 
Chūgoku kenkyū geppō 56, no. 9 (2002), 34–45; Haruhira Abe, “Rurō kazafu kaimetsu no 
kiroku,” Chūgoku kenkyū geppō 56, no. 1 (2002), 21–36. 
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Nazır (Qŭlanbay Näzĭr). His monograph contains ethnographic descriptions and sto-
ries about Kazakh migration toward Turkey, drawing on information from British 
and Turkish archives as well.13 Lastly, R. Ono, part of a younger generation of schol-
ars, supplements existing Japanese research with an analysis of this issue from the 
viewpoint of the American diplomacy (see his Chapter 4).  
A review of existing literature on Kazakh migration suggests that previous re-
search has paid less attention to the fact that many states were involved in shaping 
Kazakh migration. Therefore, it is necessary to put historical discussions of this mi-
gration within the context of international relations and diplomacy taking place at 
the time. As this chapter shows, international pressure from outside entities was sig-
nificantly responsible for the second wave of Kazakhs emigration during the 1940s 
and 1950s. 
 
3. Kazakh Society in Xinjiang Prior to Mid-20th century Migration 
In 19th century Xinjiang, each Kazakh tribe was led by members of the Kazakh 
Chinggisid nobility,14 hereditary aristocrats who held the title of Taiji (Kaz: täyzhĭ) 
under the Qing rule. Despite the leadership of the Taiji nobility, each tribal division 
was administered by a Chief of thousand (qianhu zhang). While such social structure 
was mandatorily altered within the Russian territory, Kazakhs situated within the 
Qing Empire kept this social structure15 even after the Xinhai Revolution of 1911 and 
the subsequent fall of the Qing empire. Several scholars argue that these chiefs grad-
ually replaced the hereditary Taiji,16 pointing to, for example, chiefs such as Elĭskhan, 
the Chief of Thousand who led later an emigrating group of Kazakhs out of Barköl. 
Nevertheless, even Chiang Kai-shek’s government regarded the structure of Kazakh 
social groups as led by Taiji aristocrats.17 
  As Table 1 indicates, by 1945, there were approximately 438,575 Kazakh peo-
ple living in the Xinjiang province. Part of this population had kinship ties not only 
13    Matsubara, Kazafu yūbokumin no idō.                                                                                                                             
14    Jin Noda, The Kazakh Khanates between the Russian and Qing Empires: Central Eurasian In-
ternational Relations during the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries (Leiden: Brill, 2016). 
15    Jin Noda, “Crossing the Border, Transformation of Belonging, and “International“ Con-
flict Resolution between the Russian and Qing Empires,” in T. Onuma; D. Brophy; Y. Shin-
men eds., Xinjiang in the Context of Central Eurasian Transformations (Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 
2018), 59–77. 
16  Svanberg indicated the example of Kazakhs in the Northern Xinjiang, see Ingvar 
Svanberg, “The Nomadism of Orta ǯüz Kazaks in Xinjiang 1911–1949,” in The Kazaks of Chi-
na: Essays on an Ethnic Minority, eds. L. Benson and I. Svanberg (Uppsala: Uppsala Universi-
ty, 1988), 120. 
17  Ma Lingyun reported that the several groups of Kazakhs were headed by Taijis 
(September, 1948), AH, 002-080200-00333-092. 
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within Xinjiang, but also with those living on the Soviet side of the region. Im-
portantly, the Xinjiang border was never completely sealed, with gaps in the border 
allowing many Kazakh migrants to easily move beyond the Chinese border.  
 
Nationality Population 
Uyghurs  2,988,528 
Taranchi  79,296 
Kazakhs  438,575 
Hui   99,607 
Kirghiz  69,923 
Total   3,675,929 
 
Table 1: Population of Muslim Minority Groups in Xinjiang in 194518 
 
  After the Xinhai Revolution of 1911 and the overthrow of the Qing empire in 
1912, the Xinjiang province became a semi-independent territory under Republic of 
China (ROC) rule. While under ROC administration, Xinjiang experienced two na-
tional movements. The creation of the first Eastern Turkestan Republic (ETR) (1933–
1934) represented an initial attempt to secure independence for those of Turkic de-
scent. While this movement did not have serious effects on Kazakhs living in Xin-
jiang, the oppressive provincial government lead by Sheng Shicai subsequently es-
tablished policies that were highly anti-Kazakh in nature.19 As a result, a portion of 
the nomadic Kazakh population were forced to move out of the province during the 
1930s.20 
This cohort of Kazakh emigrants is referred to here as the “first migratory 
group.” This first group of migrants began emigrating from Barköl, undertaking a 
series of treks around the Gansu and Qinghai provinces that ultimately led them on a 
perilous journey from Tibet to India. In contrast, the second Kazakh migratory group 
began of its journey out of Qinghai at the end of 1950. It is this group that is of chief 
concern for this study. The following sections attempt to illuminate the international 
and local factors that prompted the emergence of the second migratory group and 
shaped the nature of the migration that occurred.  
18    Benson, The Ili Rebellion, 30.  
19   Ō Ka [Wang Ke], Higashitorukisutan kyōwakoku kenkyū: Chūgoku no isuramu to minzoku 
mondai (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1999), 179. 
20     For instance, the criticism to Sheng Shicai, governor of the Province, by Dälelkhan Haji 
(Zhanïmkhanŭlï) on June 1, 1948 (from Social Ministry to Ministry of Foreign Affairs), AH: 
020-012600-0018, 154. 
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4. The Soviet Factor 
Soviet Influence on Kazakh Migration  
In addition to pressure to emigrate from Republic of China authorities, the So-
viet Union also influenced Kazakh migration significantly, an influence made clear 
from a review of archival documents. Since access to Soviet political archives are fre-
quently limited, and documents issued by Stalin are kept under careful control, ex-
amining Soviet diplomatic relations with China during the 1940s and 1950s must be 
approached in an eclectic manner. While research by Azerbaijani scholar Gasanly has 
established the validity of previously opened Soviet archival material, this study ad-
dresses any deficiencies in Soviet archival documents through the study of Chinese 
documents that consider Soviet policies from additional viewpoints.  
In 1945, soon after the establishment of the second Eastern Turkestan Republic 
(1944–1946), the Guomindang Government of China (GMD) tried to conciliate the 
Soviet authority for the stability in Xinjiang.21 The Soviets declared that they did not 
have any interests in Xinjiang, a declaration that may have been related to the pro-
Western sentiments of the GMD. Despite Soviet government suspicions of the pro-
American and pro-British attitude of the GMD,22 the Chinese government was rather 
optimistic about Soviet interest in Xinjiang.23  
Despite the Soviet’s professed lack of interest in the province,24 recent histori-
cal scholarship has revealed that the second Eastern Turkestan Republic was under 
the full control of the Soviets, control driven partly by the Soviet’s economic interests 
in Xinjiang.25 A review of archival material suggests that the emergence of a second 
migratory group of Kazakhs was caused by the collapse of the second ETR, with 
their migration indirectly caused by the Soviet Union’s influence in the province. 
That is, it generated anti-Soviet group of Kazakhs. This indirect impact can be seen 
through an analysis of the role of Ospan Batur in Xinjiang during the 1940s.26 
21      Wang, Under the Soviet Shadow, 225. 
22    Xue Xiantian, Zhongsu guanxi shi: 1945–1949 (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 
2003), 272. 
23    Suspicion and optimistic comment shown by a US diplomat Harry Hopkins, June 13, 
1945, AH, 002-020300-00048-025. 
24     Ō, Higashitorukisutan kyōwakoku kenkyū, 206. 
25       Terayama, Sutārin to Shinkyō, 561. While the official Soviet-Xinjiang trade was suspend-
ed, the border trade in Northern Xinjiang still continued. It is also inevitable to consider the 
Soviet interest in Xinjiang’s natural resource. 
26       For his activity in this time, see Benson, “Osman Batur”; Ömer Kul, Osman İslamoğlu'n-
dan Osman Batur Han'a 1941–1951: On Yıla Sığan Efsanevi Ömür (İstanbul: Doğu Türkistan 
Göçmenler Derneği, 2011). 
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Soviet Influence on the Leadership of Ospan Batur 
  Ospan was from the Altay region and, importantly, was of non-Chinggisid 
origin. Despite his lack of noble status, he led a group of Kazakhs in Altay to rebel 
against the Sheng Shicai-led government of Xinjiang. By 1948, an estimated 3,700 Ka-
zakh households were under Ospan’s authority.27 In August, 1945, he joined the sec-
ond ETR, a movement that was part of the first phase of the Three Districts Revolu-
tion (Sanqu geming). During negotiations between the ETR and GMD, Ospan defected 
from the ETR side and began fighting against the Communist Party of China (CPC) 
led by Mao Zedong, a party that would go on to establish the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC). Towards the end of his life, Ospan was caught by the CPC’s People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) and executed on April 29, 1951. 
  Ospan’s influence is important to consider when examining Kazakh migra-
tion to the Middle East, as it was his fight against the PLA that led directly to the 
mass emigration of Kazakhs from places in northern Xinjiang such as Barköl, the 
Altay region, and elsewhere. Many Kazakh migrants ended up in Indian territory 
(i.e. Kashmir), while Ospan himself was not authorized to leave the region. 
  Previous research, especially research from the Soviet perspective, has em-
phasized the negative influence of Ospan for the ETR and his refusal to support the 
Communist position. In contrast, this study demonstrates how Soviet policy greatly 
influenced the activity of Ospan and, by extension, Kazakh migration.28 
  It is important to recognize that the Soviets initially supported Ospan’s anti-
GMD actions.29 After Sheng Shicai’s government shifted toward anti-Soviet policies 
 
27    Ma Lingyun’s report mentions the 3,700 tents under Ospan, AH, 002-080200-00333-092. 
The figure of the other source is 1,200 tents in 1947, Benson, The Ili Rebellion, 135. 
28     Personal sides of Ospan were already examined by following works, Benson, “Osman 
Batur”; Justin Jacobs, “The Many Deaths of a Kazak Unaligned: Osman Batur, Chinese De-
colonization, and the Nationalization of a Nomad,” American Historical Review 115, no. 5 
(2010): 1291–1314; Rakhmetŭlï, XX ghasïr. Ospan – Choybalsan. Contrastively, this paper will 
try to locate the activity of Ospan in the contemporary international relations. 
29     The report by Sheng Shicai in 1950 mentioned the support from the Soviet side in 1943, 
see Waijiaobu ed., Waijiaobu dang’an conshu-jiewu lei: Xinjiang juan (Taibei: Waijiaobu, 
2001), 1: 46. Also see Sergey Radchenko, “Choibalsan’s Great Mongolia Dream,” Inner 
Asia 11, no. 2 (2009): 252–53. There were frequent meetings between Choibalsan and Ospan, 
which meant the seduction from the Soviets via Mongolia, see Kh. Bat-Ochiryn Bold and 
Kh. Bat-Ochiryn Tuiaa, Ospan khén baiv: Mongol barimt yuu ögüülév (UlaanBaatar: Nikel’ 
Dekel’ KhKhK, 2011). For relations between Ospan and Choibalsan in 1945, see V.A. Bar-
min, Sin'tszian v sovetsko-kitaiskikh otnosheniiakh 1941–1949 gg. (Barnaul: Barnaul’skii gosu-
darstvennyi pedagogicheskii universitet, 1999), 106. In addition, the GMD and the Soviets 
simultaneously tried to induce Ospan to their own side in 1945, Jacobs, Xinjiang and the 
Modern Chinese State, 160. Ospan regarded himself as a khan and behaved as if independent 
(in around 1945), Terayama, Sutārin to Shinkyō, 555. 
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in 1942, the Soviets attempted to seek the support of Kazakhs, by way of Mongolia, 
for anti-GMD government action. After the second ETR government was created in 
1944, the Xinjiang provincial coalition government was born in 1946. At that time, 
Ospan took part in the newly established coalition government as a minister without 
a portfolio.30 Ospan then aligned with Dälelkhan Sügĭrbaev, another Kazakh leader 
who was pro-Communist and based in Outer Mongolia. The Soviets reformulated 
their foreign policy, shifting their support from Ospan to Sügĭrbaev. As a result, 
Ospan developed a hostile attitude towards the Soviets. According to Soviet archives 
housed at the Wilson Center, the shift in Soviet policy away from Ospan was the re-
sult of a decision made within the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union.31 
 
The Impact of Soviet-Chinese Relations 
  Soviet relations with Xinjiang during this period were challenged by what 
became known as the Beitashan Incident of June 1947, a border conflict in the north-
ern part of Xinjiang between the Outer Mongolian government and the GMD.32 Fre-
quently referenced in historical writings, this incident was viewed as a border inva-
sion initiated by Outer Mongolia and supported by Soviet authorities,33 although 
both sides claimed the incident was based on the opponent’s initiative. While the So-
viet government officially denied its involvement in the incident almost immediate-
ly,34 documentation from the Soviet Consulate in Nanjing also suggests that the Sovi-
ets believed that Ospan and his troops had crossed over the border from Xinjiang 
side.35 Thus, the incident occurred on the delicate balance among the GMD govern-
ment, pro-ETR groups, the Soviet Union, and the Kazakhs led by Ospan.36 
  The GMD embraced the interpretation of the Beitashan Incident as a Soviet-
30     Benson, “Osman Batur,” 175. 
31    The decision of the Politburo, TsK KPSS in 24th Feb. 1947 (originally in RGASPI: f. 17, op. 
162, d. 38, ll. 154–55, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121809, accessed Feb-
ruary 1, 2019). Also see Gasanly, Sin’tszian v orbite sovetskoi politiki, 273 and 297. 
32    The earliest detailed research was conducted by Forbes, see Andrew D.W. Forbes, War-
lords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: A Political History of Republican Sinkiang 1911–1949 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 214. The Soviet historiography much in-
sisted on the US and GMD’s initiative, Wang, Under the Soviet Shadow, 277. 
33      For example, Rakhmetŭlï, XX ghasïr. Ospan – Choybalsan, 254–55. 
34      For example, FRUS, 571. 
35    June 12, AH, 002-080200-00317-035. Also see Gasanly, Sin’tszian v orbite sovetskoi politiki, 
277. 
36  The confidential telegram of Song Xilian, the Xinjiang Garrison Commander, explained 
Ospan’s relations with other powers, mentioning Kazakhs’ anti-communism attitude on 
June 9, 1947, see Waijiaobu, Waijiaobu dang’an conshu, 2: 318.  
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supported border invasion by Outer Mongolia, and thus took a firm stance in subse-
quent diplomatic negotiations with the Soviets and Mongolia.37 Chiang Kai-shek 
went as far as to recommend that the GMD should assist the Kazakh army led by 
Ospan through weapons procurement and other assistance. The ex-Chairman of the 
Government of Xinjiang Province, Zhang Zhizhong, reported from Urumqi (Dihua) 
that GMD troops in Beitashan were sent specifically to aid Ospan’s army. He highly 
suspected that the Soviets drove the Mongol army to invade Chinese territory.38 As T. 
Yoshida explains, the GMD intended to internationalize the incident, forcing the 
United States to understand it was a violation by the Soviet Union of the Sino-Soviet 
Treaty of Friendship and Alliance.39 While further consideration of the complex back-
ground of the Beitashan Incident is beyond the scope of this chapter, the incident 
demonstrates the interest of the Xinjiang provincial government at the time in using 
Ospan and his military power against the USSR, creating an obstacle for Soviet in-
volvement in the Altay region and thus prompting a shift in relations between Choi-
balsan, the Prime Minister of the Mongol People’s Republic, and Ospan.40 
  It is clear that the GMD intended to offer assistance to Ospan, despite lacking 
an official coalition with him.41 According to S. Rakhmetŭlï, a Kazakh scholar from 
Mongolia, analysis of Mongolian archival material indicates that the GMD, led by 
Zhang Zhizhong, was significantly concerned about the power and initiative of 
Ospan’s army, which might pose a threat to the GMD.42 Nevertheless, the GMD, 
37    The policy of Chiang Kai-shek, June 13, 1947, AH, 002-080200-00317-019. Besides, Chiang 
required the avoidance of the head-on clash. Shortly before the incident, Chiang indicated 
his will to support Ospan, May 3, 1947, AH, 002-080200-00316-040.  
38    June 12, AH, 002-090400-00009-417. The GMD side always tried to collect the information 
on the reaction of the Soviet side, see Waijiaobu, Waijiaobu dang’an, 2: 260.  
39    Toyoko Yoshida, “Tenkanki kokuminseifu no taiso seisaku to amerika: 1947nen nakaba,” 
in Chūgoku shakai shugi bunka no kenkyū, ed. by Y. Ishikawa (Kyoto: Kyoto Univ. Institute 
for Research in Humanities, 2010), 481. In this regard, D. Wang previously regarded, “The 
Beitashan Incident provided the GMD government a basis for an anti-Soviet and anti-
Communist campaign,” Wang, Under the Soviet Shadow, 275. 
40     Meeting of Choibalsan and Molotov was held on September 30, 1947 to discuss even the 
murder of Ospan, see Radchenko, “Choibalsan’s Great Mongolia Dream,” 253; Gasanly, 
Sin’tszian v orbite sovetskoi politiki, 297. 
41    The involvement of the GMD is still under discussion, see V.A. Barmin, “Sobytiia Mon-
golo-Kitaiskogo vooruzhyonnogo konflikta 2–8 iunia 1947 goda v zapadnoi istoriografii i 
istochnikakh tsentral’nykh arkhivov Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” Vestnik Altaiskogo gosudarstven-
nogo pedagogicheskogo universiteta 18 (2014): 19–24; Gasanly, Sin’tszian v orbite sovetskoi politi-
ki, 295. See also FRUS, 573. 
42   Rakhmetŭlï, XX ghasïr. Ospan – Choybalsan, 246. Here, Dälelkhan Sügĭrbaev highly 
warned to Zhang Zhizhong the menace of Ospan. Zhang Zhizhong’s pro-Soviet attitude 
should be considered as well, A.M. Ledovskii et al. eds., Sovetsko-kitaiskie otnosheniia, Vol. 5 
book 1 (1946–fevral’ 1950) (Moscow: Pamiatniki istoricheskoi mysli, 2000), 336. 
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from Zhang Zhizhong’s perspective, expected the military abilities of Ospan’s troops 
to present a formidable obstacle to the ETR and USSR.43 An anonymous report on the 
situation in Xinjiang suggests that not only did the GMD authority recognize the sig-
nificance of the Ospan’s military force, but the American consul at Urumqi, John Hall 
Paxton,44 did as well.45 The former-ETR side, especially Sügĭrbaev, also expected to 
use Ospan’s force.46 
As relations worsened between Ospan and the Soviets, Ospan became politi-
cally independent from any established authority involved in the region.47 Conse-
quently, he could accept various groups including Dälelkhan, Sŭltanshärĭp, 
Nurghozhay, Yolbars Khan from Uyghurs.48 Those who joined his army as well as 
those following his leadership began emigrating out of Xinjiang. 
In summation, the Soviet Union exercised both positive and negative effects 
for Kazakh migrants. On the one hand, the Soviet authority through the ETR indi-
rectly pushed the Kazakhs from northern Xinjiang, which the case of Ospan well re-
flected. On the other hand, a portion of the Kazakh migrants after the establishment 
43    Telegram from Zhang to Chiang Kai-shek, October 30, 1948, AH, 002-080-101-00054-011, 
7. Zhang mentioned the usage of the army of Ospan to confront with the ETR group. 
44    For his later activity, see Chapter 4 by Ono. Ospan’s anti-communist stance motivated 
American diplomats to stay in contact with Ospan, and these diplomats tried to support 
Kazakh groups to fight against the ETR authorities. U.S. diplomat D. Mackiernan played a 
significant role in structuralizing relations with Ospan, see A.K. Kamalov, “Amerikanskaia 
diplomatiia v Sin’tsziane: Zakrytie konsul’stva i sud’ba poslednikh predstavitelei SShA v 
Urumchi Dzh. Pakstona i D. Makirnana,” Izvestiia Natsional’noi Akademii nauk Respubliki Ka-
zakhstan, no. 1 (2012): 61–69; Gayretullah, Altaylarda Kanlı Günler, 96. As a well-known fact, 
on June 19, 1947, Paxton dispatched Mackiernan to Ospan, FRUS, 567. Later in 1948, Macki-
ernan again met with Ospan and Zhanïmkhan (Canımhan), Higa, “Intabyū Osupan 
isuramu shōshi,” 42. 
45    In 1947, AH, 002-080101-00054-010. 
46     His letter to Ospan, August 20, 1949, Xinjiang hasake zu qianxi shi bianxuezu, Xinjiang 
hasake zu qianxi shiqianxi shi, 267. 
47   Barmin, “Sobytiia Mongolo-Kitaiskogo vooruzhyonnogo konflikta,” 10. According to 
Barmin, General Song Xilian mentioned that the troops of Ospan were not under the full-
control of the GMD. In other words, Ospan and his army were in a distance from the GMD, 
while previous researchers considered that Ospan was fully in the pro-GMD side by the 
Beitashan incident. 
48     Gasanly, Sin’tszian v orbite sovetskoi politiki, 329. Since October, 1949, people from various 
standpoints like Sŭltanshärĭp (Sultan Şerif), Nurghozhay, Yolbars, Russian White Armies, 
and some Dungan groups, gathered to Barköl where Ospan and Zhanïmkhan stationed, see 
G.M. Mendikulova, Istoricheskoe i sovremennoe razvitie kazakhskoi diaspory i irredenty (Almaty: 
Qazaq universiteti, 2016), 162–63. A part of them, on May 17, 1950, left for the lake Gasköl 
(Today’s Gasikule), located at the west of Qinghai bordering the Xinjiang province. Among 
them were Dälelkhan Zhanaltay and Qalibek, who finally joined Qŭsayïn Täyzhĭ there. See 
Mendikulova, Istoricheskie sud'by kazakhskoi diaspory, 150. Also see Chapter 1. 
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of the second ETR fled into the United Soviet Socialist Republic with the approval of 
the Soviet government.49 Thus, the Soviet Union both caused the second wave of Ka-
zakh emigration as well as sought to assist Kazakh refugees. 
 
5. Chinese Influence on Kazakh Migration 
Other factors than Soviet Union influence shaped the second wave of Kazakh 
migration as well. The Republic of China also played a role in shaping Kazakh mi-
gration, particularly through the activity of the Chinese Muslim Association, which 
was under GMD authority.50 The Nationalist Party took responsibility and care for 
Kazakh refugees in Pakistan, as their homeland had to be China. Even after the ROC 
was expelled from the Chinese mainland and fled to Taiwan after Mao Zedong estab-
lished the People’s Republic of China, the GMD tried to maintain relations with Ka-
zakh migrants in Pakistan and Turkey through the China Mainland Relief Organiza-
tion.51 The GMD was concerned with the first migrant group too with payment to In-
dia for Kazakh migrant debt which occurred during their stay in India, expressing 
such concerns through the Overseas Community Affairs Council based in Taiwan. 
Here, it is important to note that the GMD authority in Taiwan aimed to recover its 
lost power at the hands of the Chinese Communist Party.52 As a result, the GMD gov-
ernment in Taiwan continuously kept contact with the Kazakh migrants out of Xin-
jiang and tried to position them on the pro-GMD side. 
 
6. Ethno-nationalist Networks and Kazakh Migration 
In addition to Soviet and Chinese influence on Kazakh migration, migrant net-
works also played a role in shaping the history of Kazakh migration. After 1949, as 
Kazakh migrants gradually migrated out of Xinjiang, these migrants engaged signifi-
cantly with the cultural networks of the region. These networks had various dimen-
sions, including an ethno-nationalist one. 
During the Sheng Shicai era, particularly during the 1940s, Kazakhs struggled 
for cultural autonomy. In 1934, the Kazakh-Kyrgyz Association for the promotion of 
49  Ablazhei, Kazakhskii migratsionnyi maiatnik, 63–69. Also see Ledovskii, Sovetsko-kitaiskie 
otnosheniia, 359. For the 1,400 Kazakhs who moved into the Soviet territory through 
Tarbaghatay in 1945, see AH, 020-021904-0001. 
50    The president of the Association visited Peshawar to the Xinjiang refugees in 1943, AH, 
020-011908-0037, 077. The name of All-Turkestan Muslim Union was also found in a docu-
ment (May, 1951), AH, 020-011908-0040. 
51    Request and aid regarding Kalibek and others in 1952, AH, 020-069911-0008. For the invi-
tation from Taiwan, see Chapter 5. 
52    In 1946–47, AH, 020-012600-0017, 99 and 103. Request for aid by the first migrant group 
of Kazakhs at Bhopal, AH, 020-012600-0018. 
? 36 ?
                                          
 
the culture was established under the instruction of Burhan Shahidi (Bao’erhan).53 Im-
portantly, the Association did not always consider the needs of all Kazakhs living in 
Xinjiang. For example, when discussing the rights of Kazakhs, the discourse of Aqït 
Ülemjĭ was often restricted to the rights of Kazakhs within the Altay region.54 None-
theless, on February 25, 1947, under the rule of the coalition government, Kazakh, 
Hui Muslims, and Han Chinese associations demonstrated in Urumqi for their 
rights.55 
Such demonstrations increased incrementally. According to a telegram to 
Chiang Kai-shek, a conference of the Kazakh Association promoting the advance-
ment of Kazakh rights was held at Urumqi in October 1947, led by Kazakh politician 
Salishi (Salïs Ermekŭlï).56 During this time, according to Zhang Zhizhong, conflict be-
tween Kazakhs and Uyghurs escalated.57 There existed a clear ethnic distinction be-
tween Kazakhs and Uyghurs and the ethno-nationalist movements during this time 
period solidified Kazakhs ethnic identity more firmly than ever. One researcher even 
stated the Uyghur chauvinism during the second ETR.58 Such a situation might be 
one of the reasons of corruption within the ETR regime and the subsequent fall of the 
coalition government. 
In the context of such movements for cultural autonomy, Kazakh ethno-
nationalism served as a contributing factor of Kazakh migration. Emigration from 
53    Asaiyin Jiakesileke, “Wo suo zhidao de yili ha, ke wenhua zujinhui,” Yili wenshi ziliao 
(Yining: Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi Yili hasake zizhizhou weiyuanhui 
wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui, 2009) 6–10: 344–7. Practically, it was established in 1935 Sep. The 
Association had its divisions in the various areas of Xinjiang, playing the role to develop the 
education for Kazakhs. 
54     Jin Noda, “The Scope of the Kazakh Intellectuals in Xinjiang: A Case of Aqit Ulemjiuli,” 
paper presented in the Workshop “Mobility of Central Asian Intellectuals: Scholarly and 
Religious Networks between Xinjiang and Middle East” (July 21, 2018, Tokyo University of 
Foreign Studies). 
55    Bao’erhan, Xinjiang wushi nian: Bao’erhan huiyi lu, (Beijing: Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe, 
1994), 308. Zhanaltay, paying attention to the Feb. 25 incident, mentioned that his father 
Zhanïmkhan was confronting with the ETR members and Burhan, see Zhanaltay, Qilï Za-
man, 61. According to the telegram from the Counterintelligence Bureau under the Ministry 
of National Defense to Chiang Kai-shek, Akhmetzhan and other ETR members wanted to 
dismiss Zhanïmkhan claiming his support for Ospan, January 26, 1947, AH, 002-080200-
00313-051. The other telegram from the Counterintelligence Bureau revealed that Zhanïm-
khan played a role on the election of Masud Sabri as a next governor of the province, April 
28, 1947, AH, 002-080200-00316-029. 
56    AH, 002-080200-00322-015. In it, for example, Kazakhs requested the more frequent us-
age of the language in the administrative documentation. 
57    Zhang’s opinion of March, 1947, AH, 001-059300-0007, 117. For the increase of the con-
frontation of the second half of 1946, see Waijiaobu, Waijiaobu dang’an conshu, 2: 296. 
58     Ō, Higashitorukisutan kyōwakoku kenkyū, 264. 
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Xinjiang thus provided Kazakhs an alternative way to achieve cultural autonomy, 
with a number of Kazakh migrants choosing to flee to the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Re-
public where they had kinship ties.  
Considering the role of Kazakh ethnic identity on Kazakh migration also re-
quires attention to the existence of countrymen in the Gansu-Qinghai regions who 
were forced to migrate from Xinjiang in the 1930s.59 After the retirement of Sheng 
Shicai, a few groups of Kazakh migrants returned to Xinjiang.60 Thereafter, some 
groups of Kazakhs still moved to and from between Xinjiang and Gansu-Qinghai re-
gions. 
Kazakh migration was also influenced by Turkic ethno-nationalist networks. 
The existence of the Eastern Turkestan Association61 and the Kashmir Association for 
Those Who Are from Xinjiang clearly shows that these groups shared an identity of 
Xinjiang origin.62 The first migratory group of Kazakhs living in Pakistan had their 
own association, the Eastern Turkestan Kazakh Refugees Association.63 
In addition, according to Matsubara, Turkish documents described the Ka-
zakh refugees in Pakistan as “Turks.” Here, pan-Turkism from the viewpoint of Tur-
key has to be considered.64 According to the reports of İsa Alptekin and Mehmet 
Emin Buğra who, in 1951, were in Kashmir traveling alongside the Kazakh second 
wave of migrants, Yolbars Khan, the later governor of Xinjiang based in Taiwan, and 
Ospan aimed to meet in Kashmir.65 In the end, Yolbars moved to Taipei and wit-
nessed Ospan’s arrest by PRC troops in February 1951.66 
 
59    Abe, “Rurō kazafu kaimetsu no kiroku.” 
60   A report on Kazakhs who returned to Xinjiang from Gansu (1949), AH, 020-021905-0002. 
Also see the above mentioned Ma’s report, AH, 002-080200-00333-092. 
61    It worked in 1940s in Kashmir, AH, 020-012600-0019, 71–72. 
62    In Chinese, “Xinji tongxianghui,” AH, 020-069911-0008. 
63     It was created on October 17, 1951, see Altay, Anayurttan Anadolu'ya, 375; Mendikulova, 
Istoricheskie sud'by kazakhskoi diaspory, 157; Matsubara, Kazafu yūbokumin no idō, 325.  
64     Matsubara, Kazafu yūbokumin no idō, 348. 
65    For the involvement by Alptekin, see AH, 020-069911-0008. Matsubara pays attention to 
their role in the relations with the Turkish government, Matsubara, Kazafu yūbokumin no idō, 
348. For instance, Polat Qadiri’s work mentioned “Turk,” including Kazakhs, Ondřej 
Klimeš, Struggle by the Pen: The Uyghur Discourse of Nation and National Interest, c. 1900–1949. 
(Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2015), 216. In spite of the famous claim by Alptekin to unify all of the 
Turkic populations in Xinjiang, it is suspicious that the Kazakhs had the sympathy with the 
Pan-Turkism thought.  
66    Alptekin’s report on the arrival of Hüseyin Teyji (200 people at Ladakh) in 1951, AH, 020
-011908-0040. 
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7. Conclusion 
  This chapter examined the historical context of the second migratory move-
ment of Kazakhs, focusing the period of the second half of 1940s, from the end of 
World War II to the consolidation of power by the Communist Party of China in 
1949. It is clear that the Soviet’s exerted significant influence on the history of Xin-
jiang, and Kazakh migration in particular, during this time. 
Cultural networks surrounding Kazakh migrants influenced the second 
wave of Kazakh migration as well. Evidently, such networks were far from the influ-
ence of the Soviet Union. Considering the impact of Turkic ethno-nationalist net-
works enabled an exploration of the issue of Kazakh migration within the broader 
context of international relations. It is clear that these networks shaped the migra-
tions of Kazakhs from Xinjiang. Despite the fact that Kazakhs in Xinjiang had ethnic 
ties with those living in the neighboring Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, these ties 
did not automatically translate into pro-Soviet sentiment. Consequently, Kazakhs 
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